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AN EXCESS OF METHODS: IDENTIFYING IMPLIED 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT C. FARRELL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s cases on implied fundamental rights have been an 
amalgam, if not a hodgepodge, of due process and equal protection reasoning.  
The Court’s modern doctrine of implied fundamental rights has grown out of 
several historically distinct lines of cases that the Court has selectively used 
and selectively ignored.  This article examines the provenance of these 
different lines of fundamental rights cases, the extent to which they were 
originally independent of each other, and the extent to which the Court has 
used them interchangeably.1 
Section II of the article will examine the various and somewhat 
independent lines of fundamental rights cases that the Court decided before 
1960.  Section III will illustrate how, beginning in the 1960s, the Court in some 
instances began to treat these different lines of precedents as interchangeable 
and thus treated the due process and equal protection versions of implied 
fundamental rights analysis as roughly equivalent.  Section IV will then 
examine each of the methods the Court has used to identify implied 
fundamental rights under both the Due Process and the Equal Protection 
Clauses. 
 
* B.A., Trinity College; J.D., Harvard University; Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University 
School of Law. 
 1. There is an abundance of scholarly literature on the subject of implied fundamental 
rights, a summary of which is well beyond the scope of this article, which will limit itself to a 
close and critical examination of the cases, thus focusing on what the Court itself has done. A 
sampling of the scholarly theories of constitutional interpretation that would help to explain 
where implied fundamental rights come from include (1) natural law, see JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 48-54 (1980); (2) neutral 
principles, see id. at 54-60; (3) original intent, see Edwin Meese, III, Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1988); (4) original meaning, see, e.g., Randy E. 
Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 (2001); and 
(5) policing the process, see ELY, supra, at 73-104.  For an earlier, lengthier, and different 
treatment of the sources of implied fundamental rights, see David Crump, How Do the Courts 
Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial 
Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795 (1995). 
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II.  THE PRE-1960S IMPLIED FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CASES 
During the years before 1960, when the Court decided cases that would 
now likely be said to involve “implied fundamental rights,” it did not use any 
standardized terminology and the more recent terms like “implied fundamental 
rights,” “strict scrutiny” and “compelling interest” did not appear.  Rather, the 
Court during this time developed what would eventually become implied 
fundamental rights analysis in five independent, unconnected lines of 
precedents: (1) the “liberty of contract” cases associated with Lochner v. New 
York,2 (2) the selective incorporation cases, (3) the fundamental rights cases 
under the Equal Protection Clause, (4) Snyder v. Massachusetts, which 
established the “history and tradition” test,3 and (5) Rochin v. California, 
which established the “shocks the conscience” standard.4 
A. Lochner and its Progeny 
In the earliest of these lines, represented by Lochner v. New York5 and its 
progeny and beginning in 1897,6 the Court focused on the term “liberty” in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and construed it to include 
“freedom of contract.”  From this starting point, the Court was very likely to 
conclude that any attempt by the state to regulate contractual relations was an 
unconstitutional infringement on a protected liberty.  This meant that state 
statutes setting minimum wages7 or maximum hours8 in the workplace or 
protecting the right of workers to unionize9 were presumptively 
unconstitutional.  The Court in these Lochner-era cases did not use the terms 
“fundamental rights” or “strict scrutiny,” but, in its review of these labor 
statutes, it used a level of review that was as demanding as implied by the 
modern term “strict scrutiny.”  Whenever the Court in a Lochner-type case 
determined that a statute infringed on a protected “liberty” interest, the statute 
 
 2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 3. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
 4. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 6. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.  The beginning of the Lochner era is considered to have begun 
in 1897, the year in which the Court decided Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) 
(invalidating a Louisiana statute that prohibited obtaining insurance on Louisiana property from 
an insurer who had not complied with Louisiana law, on the ground that it interfered with liberty 
of contract). 
 7. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating District of Columbia 
law requiring minimum wages for women). 
 8. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45 (invalidating New York law prohibiting employment of bakery 
employees for more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week). 
 9. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating Kansas statute that prohibited 
employers from requiring employees not to join a union). 
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was typically invalidated as a matter of course, usually without measuring the 
significance of the government’s interest in regulating that activity.10 
The Lochner-era ended in 1937 when the Court decided West Coast Hotel 
v. Parrish, a case that upheld a minimum wage statute and specifically 
overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,11 a Lochner-type case to the contrary.  
As the Parrish Court explained, “The Constitution does not speak of freedom 
of contract.”12  Therefore, the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause 
was not an “absolute and uncontrollable”13 liberty, but rather one subject to 
“regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject.”14  Thus, the Parrish 
case effectively ended any kind of rigid scrutiny of government regulation of 
business and commercial matters in the name of protecting constitutional 
liberty and, if that were the end of the story, the Lochner line of cases would be 
of historical significance only. 
Mixed in, however, with the typical Lochner case regulating 
labor/management relations were two cases in which the state attempted to 
regulate parental control over children.  In the first of these, Meyer v. 
Nebraska,15 the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited the teaching of 
foreign languages, and in the second, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,16 the Court 
invalidated a statute that required parents to send their children to public 
schools. The Meyer Court specifically cited Lochner as one of its sources and 
then gave an extremely broad definition of “liberty” that went well beyond 
Lochner’s.  For, according to the Court in Meyer, 
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but 
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home 
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.17 
Fourteen years after Meyer, the Court overruled Adkins and in doing so 
rejected Lochner’s expansive reading of the term “liberty” in relation to state 
 
 10. But there were occasional cases to the contrary. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 
(1908) (upholding a maximum hour law for women because a woman’s “physical structure” put 
her at a disadvantage); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 439 (1917) (upholding a maximum hour 
day for factory workers). 
 11. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 
(1923)). 
 12. Id. at 391. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 262 U.S. 390, 396-397 (1923). 
 16. 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925). 
 17. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
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regulation of business contracts.18  It was not immediately clear how that 
overruling would affect Meyer and Pierce, with their broad reading of the term 
“liberty” in the context of family relations.  Time would tell that Meyer and 
Pierce did survive Parrish, and thus this one part of the Lochner line of cases 
is still considered relevant precedent for today’s implied fundamental rights 
cases. 
B. Selective Incorporation 
At the same time that the Court was exalting freedom of contract in the 
Lochner line of cases, it was also deciding an independent and entirely separate 
set of Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” cases–those involving the selective 
incorporation against the states of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
which by their terms were applicable only against the federal government.  
During this time, a majority of the Court never adopted the view that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the entire Bill of 
Rights.19  Thus, the Court needed a principle to explain which of those 
protections were incorporated against the states and which were not.  In 1937, 
just nine months after Parrish, the Court in Palko v. Connecticut announced 
such a principle–that the term “liberty” included only those rights that were 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”20Under this principle, the Court 
would look at each provision of the Bill of Rights and decide whether or not 
that particular provision was “implicit in concept of ordered liberty.”21  
Although the Court was deciding these selective incorporation cases during the 
same time frame as it was deciding the Lochner precedents, the two lines of 
cases operated independently of each other.  Palko, for example, did not cite 
any of the Lochner precedents.  Since there are a finite number of protections 
in the Bill of Rights, the selective incorporation cases are something of a 
closed universe, and they too, like the Lochner cases, might be merely of 
historical interest.  Nevertheless, just as one element of the generally discarded 
Lochner world view has survived in Meyer and Pierce, so one element of the 
selective incorporation cases survives, that is, Palko’s “implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty” test, which the Court continues to cite today. 
C. Implied Fundamental Rights Under the Equal Protection Clause 
Independent of these two lines of cases (the Lochner and the selective 
incorporation lines), the Court during the 1940s began a third line of 
fundamental rights cases, this one under the Equal Protection Clause.  In 1942, 
 
 18. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
 19. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 58 (1947) (rejecting total incorporation). 
 20. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see infra Section IV.B.1 for a further 
discussion of the “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” standard. 
 21. Id. at 325. 
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just five years after it had decided Parrish and Palko, the Court in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma22 considered the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute that 
provided for the sterilization of felons convicted three times of felonies 
involving “moral turpitude.”23  This factual setting was an obvious candidate 
for some kind of heightened scrutiny given the significance and permanence of 
the state’s decision to sterilize.  In fact, the language in Meyer about protecting 
the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children”24 would have been 
an obvious precedent to cite in support of an argument that sterilization by the 
state invaded a protected liberty interest.  The Court, however, had just 
overruled that Lochner-kind of reasoning, at least with regard to government 
regulation of commerce, and the continuing status of Meyer and Pierce was 
unclear. Thus, instead of reopening the controversial question about what 
exactly is contained within the due process concept of “liberty,” the Court 
decided Skinner as an equal protection case, since the Oklahoma legislature 
had not treated all three-time felons the same.25 
The Court then needed to address how strictly it ought to apply the equal 
protection mandate.  Since this was not a due process case, the Court did not 
need to concern itself with the intricacies of the term “liberty.”26  Without 
reference to any provision of the Constitution, the Court announced that 
procreation was “one of the basic civil rights of man,” “fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race,” and that the Oklahoma statute would 
thus be subject to “strict scrutiny.” 27  With these words, the Court in Skinner 
effectively created the equal protection version of implied fundamental rights 
reasoning.  In the years following Skinner, the Court used implied fundamental 
rights analysis under the Equal Protection Clause to find that there was a 
fundamental right to vote in state elections28 and a fundamental right to some 
level of access to the criminal process in the courts.29  Until the 1960s, these 
implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause tended to 
ignore the “liberty” precedents of the Lochner-era and of the selective 
incorporation cases, but they tended similarly to lead to invalidation. 
D. Snyder and the History and Traditions Test 
In addition to these three principal pre-1960s lines of cases, two additional 
kinds of fundamental rights precedents arose in the area of criminal procedure 
 
 22. 316 U.S. 535, 536-37 (1942). 
 23. Id. at 535-37. 
 24. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399. 
 25. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-541. 
 26. See generally id. 
 27. Id. at 541. 
 28. See infra Section IV.F.1. 
 29. See infra Section IV.F.2. 
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but outside of the selective incorporation line.  In the first of these, the 1934 
case of Snyder v. Massachusetts,30 the Court considered the claim that a 
criminal defendant had been denied the right to accompany the jury when it 
went to visit the scene of the crime.  The Court, in rejecting his due process 
challenge, adopted the test that “liberty” includes only those principles of 
justice “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental.”31  This “traditions” test, although slightly reformulated as a 
“history and tradition” test by more recent cases,32 has become one of the 
Court’s modern due process tests. 
E. Rochin and the Shocks the Conscience Test 
Finally, in 1952, in Rochin v. California,33 a case in which the police had 
arranged to have a suspect’s stomach pumped in order to find evidence of 
illegal drugs, the Court announced that government conduct that “shocks the 
conscience” would constitute an invasion of a constitutionally protected 
liberty.34  This “shocks the conscience” standard, although ignored by the 
Court for many years, has recently been revived as a test of the constitutionally 
protected liberty interest.35  As the 1960s arrived, the Court had decided 
implied fundamental rights precedents in five separate lines of cases.  The 
terminology used in these cases was not standardized.  The Lochner and the 
selective incorporation cases focused on the term “liberty.”  In the equal 
protection cases, the Court did use the terms “fundamental right” and “strict 
scrutiny,” but made no reference to “liberty.” The “traditions” and the “shocks 
the conscience” tests were waiting in the background.  In the meantime, the 
general process of using the term “liberty” to impose substantive limitations on 
government would come to be called “substantive due process.”36 
III.  THE SELECTIVE EQUIVALENCE AND INTERCHANGEABILITY OF DUE 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION PRECEDENTS IN IMPLIED FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS CASES 
As noted in the previous section, the Supreme Court has decided implied 
fundamental rights cases under both the Due Process and the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Before 1960, however, the Court 
treated these lines of precedent as independent of each other.  Beginning in the 
 
 30. 291 U.S. 97, 103 (1934). 
 31. Id. at 105. 
 32. See infra, Section IV.C. 
 33. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
 34. Id. at 172. 
 35. See infra Section IV.D. 
 36. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (“Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court.”). 
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1960s, however, the Court, when it suited its purposes, began on occasion to 
treat the due process and equal protection precedents as interchangeable.  To 
the extent that fundamental rights themselves under the two Clauses are 
interchangeable, suggested that the methods for identifying those rights under 
the two Clauses would also be interchangeable.  Thus, any thorough 
examination of the methods of identifying implied fundamental rights under 
either of the Clauses must take into account the methods of identifying them 
under the other Clause as well.  These parallel examinations will lead to the 
conclusion that the Court uses a multiplicity of methods in identifying implied 
fundamental rights.  This Section, then, will demonstrate how the Court has in 
certain contexts engrafted the due process and equal protection cases onto each 
other. 
Before illustrating that point, it should first be noted that it is not obvious 
why there is any need to use both the Due Process and the Equal Protection 
Clauses to identify neither implied fundamental rights nor that suggests why 
the two Clauses would be interchangeable.  At a theoretical and conceptual 
level, these two Clauses are quite distinct and impose different types of limits 
on governmental conduct.  Thus, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which says that a state may not “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law,” has both a procedural and a 
substantive aspect.37  Under the doctrine of procedural due process, the state 
may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without notice and a 
hearing.38  The doctrine of substantive due process imposes substantive limits 
on government whenever government action interferes with activity that is 
within a protected interest defined as “life,” “liberty” or “property.”39  On the 
other hand, the Equal Protection Clause, which says that the state may not deny 
to any person the “equal protection of the laws,” imposes no substantive limits 
on government.40  It works rather as a comparative limitation on government 
classifications–thus it requires that those similarly situated be treated 
 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 38. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976) (“Procedural due process 
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or 
‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . .  This court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an 
individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”). 
 39. Where no fundamental right is involved, this “substantive” limitation on government is 
in fact virtually no limitation at all, for a governmental restriction on a non-fundamental right 
need satisfy only the very deferential test of being “rationally related to legitimate government 
interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).  This is a standard that 
invariably leads to the conclusion that the contested restriction is constitutional.  On the other 
hand, where the government restricts a fundamental right, under the doctrine of substantive due 
process a much more demanding scrutiny is used. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 
(1973). 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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similarly.41 Where the Court finds that a classification infringes on an implied 
fundamental right, it will examine that classification with a more demanding 
scrutiny.42 
Thus, it initially seems that the two Clauses work in quite different ways–
the first a substantive principle protecting life, liberty, and property, and the 
second a comparative equality principle that has no substantive content of its 
own.  Notwithstanding the initial plausibility of that distinction, however, with 
regard to the doctrine of implied fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has in 
certain instances treated the two doctrines as equivalent and interchangeable.  
Thus, the Court commonly cites implied fundamental rights equal protection 
cases in support of due process conclusions and implied fundamental rights 
due process cases in support of equal protection conclusions.  This overlap 
between the doctrines is exemplified in Roe v. Wade43 and in a long line of 
marriage cases where the Court has gone back and forth between due process 
and equal protection analysis.44 
In Roe, as a substantive matter, the Court established the constitutional 
principle that the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause includes a right of 
privacy that “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not 
to terminate her pregnancy.”45  In addition to the substance of its holding, 
however, the Court in Roe made clear that, when it served its purposes, it 
would treat the due process and equal protection cases as interchangeable.46  
Thus, the Court in Roe began by conceding the obvious–that “[t]he 
 
 41. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (“By providing dissimilar treatment for 
men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (finding that where any 
classification serves to penalize the exercise of a constitutional right, it must be shown to be 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest in order to be constitutional).  This brief 
summary of the differences between due process and equal protection reasoning does suggest one 
basic difference between fundamental rights analyses under the two Clauses.  When the Court 
finds that a right is fundamental under the Due Process Clause, it is clear that the implied right 
comes directly out of the Due Process Clause, that is, from its protection of “liberty.”  On the 
other hand, to speak of an implied fundamental right “arising under” the Equal Protection Clause 
is technically inaccurate since that Clause creates no substantive rights.  Rather, when the Court 
speaks of an implied fundamental right in an equal protection case, it is finding a freestanding 
implied fundamental right–that is, a right independent of the term “liberty” in the Due Process 
Clause and independent of any other explicit provision in the Constitution–and then imposing a 
very strict comparative standard of equality on classifications that infringe on such an implied 
right.  What this means is that implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection 
Clause inevitably involve rights implied from somewhere other than the Equal Protection Clause. 
 43. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 46-74. 
 45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 46. Id. at 152. 
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Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.”47  Then, in 
support of its assertion that there was nevertheless a constitutionally protected 
right of privacy, the Court cited “a line of decisions . . .  going back perhaps as 
far as [1891]  . . . [in which] the Court has recognized that a right of personal 
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under 
the Constitution.”48  The Court then followed this assertion with a citation to a 
string of cases that supported the claim.49  The cited cases included: (1) from 
the implied fundamental rights precedents of the Lochner era, both Meyer and 
Pierce, although significantly, Lochner itself and its “freedom of contract” 
relatives were omitted; (2) from the selective incorporation cases, Palko, with 
its reference to “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty;” and (3) from the 
cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause, both Skinner and Eisenstadt v. 
Baird.50 The citation to Eisenstadt is particularly good evidence of the 
interlocking of due process and equal protection cases.  Eisenstadt was a 1971 
case that provided the essential link between Griswold v. Connecticut,51 the 
first of the modern privacy cases, and Roe v. Wade.  In Griswold, the Court had 
invalidated a Connecticut statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by a 
married couple, on the ground that it invaded a fundamental right of marital 
privacy arising from the “penumbras formed by emanations” from particular 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.52  Seven years later, in Eisenstadt, the Court 
reviewed a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons and invalidated it as a matter of equal 
protection.53  Without deciding exactly what the constitutional right of access 
to contraceptives is, the Eisenstadt Court insisted that “the rights must be the 
same for the unmarried and the married alike.”54  Then, in the course of 
explaining why the right was the same for both, despite the obvious difference 
between married and unmarried couples that had appeared to be so important 
in Griswold, the Court described this right of privacy in words that would 
become the foundation of Roe v. Wade.  The Court stated: “If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be 
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”55  As Roe 
would very shortly make clear, the right to decide whether to bear a child 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 52. Id. at 484; see infra Section IV.E.2. 
 53. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (emphasis removed). 
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would necessarily include within it the right to decide not to bear a child.56  
Thus Eisenstadt, an equal protection case, is the essential link between 
Griswold and Roe, the two most significant privacy cases the Court has 
decided. 
The Court in Roe made an additional contribution to the interchangeability 
of implied fundamental rights cases under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses in terms of the appropriate test to be applied.  The Roe 
Court stated, “Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has 
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling 
state interest.’”57  With these words, the Court equated the due process and 
equal protection tests for review of implied fundamental rights.58  As noted 
above, the Lochner era decisions of the Court did in fact apply a very 
demanding level of scrutiny as did the selective incorporation cases, but it was 
not until Shapiro v. Thompson59 in 1969 (an equal protection case) and Roe in 
1973 (a due process case) that fundamental rights cases under due process and 
equal protection were subject to the same “compelling interest” test. 
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Roe, made clear both that the majority had 
in fact equated the two tests and that he disagreed with that result.  According 
to Rehnquist, “the Court adds a new wrinkle to this [compelling state interest] 
test by transposing it from the legal considerations associated with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to this case arising under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment  . . . accomplish[ing] the 
seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it 
found it.”60  Whether or not Justice Rehnquist’s disapproval is deserved, he did 
accurately state what the Roe majority had done.61  Thus, the Court in Roe 
made clear that the different strands of implied fundamental rights cases were 
sufficiently close to a core principle that it was appropriate to cite them 
interchangeably and that the Court would apply the same “compelling interest” 
test to both due process and equal protection cases. 
This interchangeability and equivalence of implied fundamental rights 
reasoning under due process and equal protection reasoning is further 
illustrated in the Supreme Court opinions on marriage as a fundamental right.  
In 1923, in Meyer, the Court had found that the right to marry was part of the 
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause.62  In 1942, in Skinner, the Court 
 
 56. See generally 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 57. 410 U.S. at 155 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)). 
 58. See supra text accompanying notes 46. 
 59. 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (insisting that “any classification which serves to penalize the 
exercise of [a constitutional right], unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”) (emphasis removed). 
 60. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
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found, without any reference to “liberty” in the Due Process Clause or to 
Meyer itself, that as a matter of equal protection marriage is fundamental.63  In 
1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut,64 which was neither a due process nor an 
equal protection decision, marriage was described as part of “a right of privacy 
older than the Bill of Rights–older than our political parties, older than our 
school system . . . an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions.”65  In 1967, in Loving v. Virginia,66 the Court invalidated 
Virginia’s prohibition on interracial marriage on both an equal protection 
ground (because of its racial classification) and also a due process ground 
(because “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”67).  
And what authority did the Loving Court cite for this claim that the Due 
Process Clause included a fundamental right to marry?  Why Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, of course, that very relevant equal protection case. 
Four years later, in Boddie v. Connecticut,68 the Court found that the 
imposition of certain court and filing fees that restricted the plaintiffs in their 
effort to bring an action for divorce violated the Due Process Clause.69  In 
setting forth the theoretical framework under which the case would be decided, 
the Court said, “As this Court on more than one occasion has recognized, 
marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society.”70  In support of 
this assertion, the Court cited what were now becoming the old standbys–
Loving, Skinner, and Meyer,71 thus once again moving back and forth between 
due process and equal protection without even appearing to notice.  Citing the 
state’s monopolization of the process for entering into and terminating the 
fundamental right of marriage, the Court concluded that “a State may not, 
consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship 
without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing 
so.”72 
In 1978, in Zablocki v. Redhail,73 the Court’s opinion demonstrated how 
completely interlocked were its due process and equal protection precedents as 
they applied to the fundamental right to marriage.  In that case, the Court 
 
 63. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85. 
 64. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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 68. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 69. Id. at 376. 
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invalidated a Wisconsin statute under which the state would not grant a 
marriage license to an applicant with outstanding child support orders unless 
he had received permission from a court.74  The Supreme Court treated the 
case as arising under the Equal Protection Clause,75 and its chain of citations 
demonstrating that marriage is a fundamental right included, inter alia, Loving, 
Skinner, Meyer, and Griswold.76  Once the Court had determined that the 
statute infringed on the right to marry and would thus be strictly scrutinized, 
invalidation followed quickly.  Since the Court was using an equal protection 
analysis, it needed to identify a class of persons treated differently from 
another class without adequate justification.  The Court did so by identifying 
“a certain class of Wisconsin residents [who] may not marry . . . without first 
obtaining a court order granting permission to marry.”77  By inference, the 
comparison class was everyone else in Wisconsin who did not need a court 
order to get married.  The Court determined that there were other ways for the 
state to accomplish its statutory goals and thus determined that the statute did 
not survive heightened scrutiny.78 
Justice Stewart concurred in the result in Zablocki, but his refusal to join 
the majority opinion is instructive on the relationship of fundamental rights 
analysis under the due process and equal protection clauses.  Justice Stewart 
conceded that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family 
life is one of the liberties” protected by the Due Process Clause.79  According 
to Stewart, however, the Equal Protection Clause was not relevant to the matter 
before the Court since: 
Like almost any law, the Wisconsin statute now before us affects some people 
and does not affect others.  But to say that it thereby creates ‘classifications’ in 
the equal protection sense strikes me as little short of fantasy.  The problem in 
this case is not one of discriminatory classifications, but of unwarranted 
encroachment upon a constitutionally protected freedom.  I think that the 
Wisconsin statute is unconstitutional because it exceeds the bounds of 
permissible state regulation of marriage, and invades the sphere of liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.80 
As a matter of logic, there is much to recommend of Justice Stewart’s 
analysis, for at a conceptual level there surely ought to be a difference between 
the substantive protection of liberty under due process and the comparative 
 
 74. Id. at 375-77. 
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 76. Id. at 383-84. 
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protection of classes under equal protection. Stewart’s view was expressed 
only in a concurring opinion, however, and is quite inconsistent with what the 
majority did in Zablocki and with what the Court has done in the other cases 
discussed in this section. 
Before leaving this section on the interchangeability of due process and 
equal protection precedents in the Supreme Court, one major qualification is in 
order.  The interchangeability goes to the Court’s initial identification of the 
implied fundamental right.  It does not carry over into the mode of analysis 
once that right has been identified.  This difference arises because, as noted 
supra,81 fundamental rights cases under the Due Process Clause are 
substantive, involving state interference with a protected “liberty” interest, 
while fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause are 
comparative, involving the nonsubstantive claim that, if the state treats one 
person a certain way, it has to treat similarly situated persons that way too. 
This distinction is quite clear in the Court’s precedents.  If Skinner, for 
example, had been a due process opinion decided after Roe v. Wade, the Court 
would probably have concluded that, since a policy of sterilization affected the 
implied fundamental right of procreation, the state could never sterilize any 
individual person without a compelling interest.  The Skinner Court’s actual 
equal protection opinion was more limited.  In effect, it said that, if the state 
wanted to sterilize anyone who has three times committed felonies involving 
moral turpitude, then it must sterilize all such felons.82  The problem with the 
Oklahoma sterilization statute was a comparative one, that is, its selectively 
different treatment of those similarly situated. 
Other implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause 
also illustrate this kind of comparative reasoning.  In Harper v. Virginia State 
Board of Elections,83 the Court was addressing the question of whether or not a 
poll tax implicated an implied fundamental right to vote.84  One obvious 
problem with this line of argument was the fact that, as the Court noted, “the 
right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned [in the 
Constitution].”85  Since states in some instances do not have to hold elections 
at all, it would be difficult, as a matter of due process, to insist that the right to 
vote in state elections is fundamental.  But in fact, states have chosen to select 
most office holders through a popular vote.  And thus, as a matter of equal 
protection, “it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the 
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electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”86  As in Skinner, the 
comparative nature of the equal protection mandate means that, if the state 
wants to deprive certain individuals of the right to vote, it has to treat everyone 
that way. 
Griffin v. Illinois87 is one further illustration of this kind of comparative 
equal protection reasoning in implied fundamental rights cases.  In Griffin, the 
Court considered the claim that a person convicted at a criminal trial but 
unable to pay for a transcript needed for an appeal was entitled to have that 
transcript provided by the state without charge.88  The problem with such a 
claim was that, as the Court pointed out, “a State is not required by the Federal 
Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.”89  
Thus, it seems that the complainant in Griffin would have a difficult time 
claiming a constitutional right to such a transcript.  The state, however, had 
created a system of appellate courts and had provided for a system of appellate 
review.  Thus, as in Harper, as a matter of comparative equal protection, the 
Court was able to say that, once a state had created such a system, it could not 
grant appellate review “in a way that discriminates against some convicted 
defendants on account of their poverty.”90 
 Thus, although the nature of the scrutiny applied to state infringement of 
implied fundamental rights issues is different under the Equal Protection and 
the Due Process Clauses, the Court on occasion considers the cases to be 
interchangeable in terms of identifying those implied fundamental rights. 
IV.  THE DIFFERENT METHODS THE SUPREME COURT HAS USED TO IDENTIFY 
IMPLIED FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
This Section will examine the different methods, under the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses, that the Court has used to identify implied 
fundamental rights.  Specifically, the Court has recognized certain rights as 
fundamental because (A) they are important; (B) they are implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution; (C) 
they are deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition; (D) they need 
protection from government action that shocks the conscience; (E) they are 
necessarily implied from the structure of government or from the structure of 
the Constitution; (F) they provide necessary access to governmental processes; 
and (G) previous Supreme Court precedents so identify them. 
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A. Because They Are Important 
The simplest and most straightforward method the Court has used to 
identify an implied fundamental right is to ask–How important is the claimed 
right?  In 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court decided the first of its 
implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause.91  The 
Court determined that it would apply a more demanding scrutiny to a law that 
authorized the sterilization of felons who had been convicted three times of 
felonies involving moral turpitude.92  Why the heightened scrutiny? The Court 
explained, 
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil 
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race.  The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, 
far reaching and devastating effects. . . .We advert to [these matters] merely in 
emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State 
makes in a sterilization law is essential.93 
Note first what is not here.  Because this is not a due process analysis, there is 
no need to attach the fundamental right to procreate to the term “liberty.”  
There is no reference to rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and 
no reference to anything being “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and 
tradition.”  There is no attempt to infer the implied right from any other 
provision of the Constitution, from the structure of the federal government, or 
from the structure of the Constitution itself.  There is simply a bold assertion, 
based on an incontrovertible fact of human existence, that procreation is 
fundamental because it is essential “to the very existence and survival of the 
race.”94  In short, the test of whether or not a right is fundamental seems to be a 
simple matter–how important it is. 
Unfortunately, the simplicity of this test has the effect of proving too 
much.  If a right is fundamental for constitutional purposes because of its 
importance to the survival of the human race, then basic claims to food, 
clothing, and shelter would also seem to be fundamental as well.  And what 
about education, which the Supreme Court called “the most important function 
of state and local governments?”95 
However, the Court has rejected attempts to extend Skinner beyond its 
factual setting and, in the course of doing so, has treated the Skinner precedent 
in a very ambivalent manner.  On the one hand, the Court continues to cite 
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Skinner on a very regular basis in some of its most important cases,96 thus 
suggesting that it is a very viable and current precedent, at least for the 
substance of its holding that procreation is a fundamental right.  Yet, at the 
same time, the Court has rejected the Skinner Court method for determining 
that procreation is a fundamental right. Thus, for example, in the 1970 case of 
Dandridge v. Williams,97 the Court considered an equal protection challenge to 
Maryland’s welfare program.98  When determining the proper level of review, 
the Court noted how significant were the welfare grants that were the subject 
of the suit and described those grants as among “the most basic economic 
needs of impoverished human beings.”99  For all that, the Court neither cited 
Skinner nor made any reference to its method of finding rights fundamental 
because of their connection to the “existence and survival of the race.”  Rather, 
the Court said simply, “the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no 
power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic 
or social policy.”100  Thus, the Court upheld the state’s challenged calculations 
of financial need in the welfare program under a very deferential standard: “A 
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it.”101 
Two years later, in the 1972 case of Lindsey v. Normet,102 the Court 
considered an equal protection challenge to Oregon’s summary process for 
evicting tenants, a procedure that was much speedier than other civil actions 
and much more limited in terms of the issues that could be raised.103  The 
plaintiffs who challenged that process argued for heightened scrutiny since 
“the ‘need for decent shelter’ and the ‘right to retain peaceful possession of 
one’s home’ are fundamental interests which are particularly important to the 
poor and which may be trenched upon only after the State demonstrates some 
superior interest.”104  This is the kind of reasoning that the Court used in 
Skinner, but this time the Court rejected the claim, saying, “We do not 
denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.  But the 
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic 
ill.  We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of 
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access to dwellings of a particular quality.”105  The Court went on to use a very 
deferential form of review and uphold the summary process action.106 
The Lindsey Court made no mention of Skinner, so there was no need to 
distinguish Skinner’s reasoning.  Further, the Court made the telling reference 
to its inability to perceive “in that document” (referring to the Constitution) 
any constitutional guarantee of housing.107  Of course, it ought not to be 
surprising that an alleged implied fundamental right will not be found “in that 
document.”  By definition, an implied fundamental right will not be found 
explicitly in the Constitution itself.  Further, as a matter of loyalty to precedent, 
the Court in Lindsey was overlooking the fact that the Court in Skinner 
likewise could not have found “in that document” a right to procreate.  But the 
Lindsey opinion was consistent with the Court’s views in Dandridge, and it 
also served as a bridge to the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez,108 in which the Court appeared to bury the Skinner 
methodology. 
In Rodriguez, the Court considered an equal protection challenge to the 
method of financing public schools in Texas through local property taxes.109  
The effect of this method was to produce great disparities in per pupil spending 
in different school districts.110  The plaintiffs in this suit argued that the Court 
should strictly scrutinize these disparities since the right to education with 
which they interfered, was a fundamental one.111  The Court’s initial response 
appeared to be very favorable to the plaintiffs and consistent with Skinner.112  
The Court conceded that “education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments,”113 that it “is required in the performance of our 
most basic public responsibilities,”114 and that it is “the foundation of good 
citizenship.”115  Ultimately, however, in terms of the standard of review that 
the Court would apply, none of that mattered, for “the importance of a service 
performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as 
fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”116 
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What then was the test? According to the Court, 
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in 
the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.  Thus, the key to 
discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in 
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to 
subsistence or housing.  Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is 
as important as the right to travel.  Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether 
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution.117 
Since this new Rodriguez test directly conflicted with the method the Court 
had followed in Skinner, one might have expected the Court to overrule or 
distinguish Skinner.  Surprisingly, the Court cited Skinner as supporting 
authority for its claim that the true test of a fundamental right was not its 
societal significance but whether it was “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by 
the Constitution.”118  This turns the Skinner holding on its head.  The Court 
attempted to explain this away with the claim that “[i]mplicit in the Court’s 
opinion [in Skinner] is the recognition that the right of procreation is among 
the rights of personal privacy protected under the Constitution.  See Roe v. 
Wade.”119  This purported explanation is entirely unconvincing.  The Skinner 
opinion, of course, had nothing to do with privacy, nothing to do with liberty, 
nothing to do with the Due Process Clause, and could not possibly have 
envisioned the Court’s due process opinion forty-one years later in Roe.  The 
Court in Skinner, of course, had made no attempt to ground the fundamental 
right to procreate in any language in the Constitution, but the Rodriguez Court 
saw a very different Skinner. 
The absolute nature of the language in Rodriguez and its outright rejection 
of “societal significance” as relevant to the search for implied fundamental 
rights would seem to have put an end to the matter.  It didn’t.  Twelve years 
later, in Plyler v. Doe,120 the Court once again reviewed under the Equal 
Protection Clause a Texas statute that limited access to education.121  This time 
the statute authorized local school districts to deny free public school education 
to the children of undocumented aliens.122  After Rodriguez, it might be 
expected that the Court would find that the statute implicated no fundamental 
right and thus would uphold it with minimal scrutiny.  In fact, the Court 
initially paid lip service to Rodriguez, stating that “[p]ublic education is not a 
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‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.”123  But then the Court 
added, 
But neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from 
other forms of social welfare legislation.  Both the importance of education in 
maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on 
the life of the child, mark the distinction . . . .  In sum, education has a 
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.124 
Having thus announced the importance of education, the Court adopted a 
somewhat heightened level of scrutiny and invalidated the statute.125 
This method of weighing the value of education that the Plyler Court used 
sounds quite a bit like a test of “societal significance,” without any reference to 
the text of the Constitution.  Thus, the original Skinner test–it’s fundamental 
because it’s important–is not really dead.  But  Plyler seems to be the only 
post-Skinner case to apply it.  Justice Marshall has argued that the importance 
of an interest should be considered as part of a balancing test he would use in 
place of the rigid three tiers of review under the Equal Protection Clause.126  
As part of Marshall’s balancing, the Court would consider “the relative 
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the 
governmental benefits that they do not receive.”127  The Court has never 
adopted Justice Marshall’s view. 
B. Because They Are Implicit in the Concept of Ordered Liberty or Implicitly 
Guaranteed by the Constitution 
At two different times, in two different kinds of cases, the Court has 
adopted a test for finding implied fundamental rights that is so circular and 
empty that it is hard to believe it has had any staying power.  Nevertheless, it 
has.  This is a test that answers a question–what fundamental rights should be 
implied from the Constitution–by repeating the question: implicit rights are 
those that are implicit in the Constitution.  This “implicit” test has both a due 
process and an equal protection version. 
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1. “Implicit in the Concept of Ordered Liberty” and the Due Process 
Clause 
In 1937, in Palko v. Connecticut,128  a selective incorporation case, the 
Court was deciding the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment’s right to be free 
of double jeopardy was to be incorporated as part of the “liberty” protected 
against the states by the Due Process Clause.129 The Court determined that it 
was not, because that right was not “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty”130 and thus abolishing it would not “violate a ‘principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’”131  The Court distinguished the protection against double 
jeopardy from a set of rights-freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free 
exercise of religion, right of peaceable assembly, and the right of one accused 
of a crime to the benefit of counsel–all of which the Court had already 
incorporated against the states132 and were thus presumptively “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.” On the other hand, the Court found that the 
protection against double jeopardy was quite similar to another set of rights-the 
protection against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right not 
to be prosecuted without an indictment–all of which the Court at that time had 
not incorporated against the states133 and which were thus presumptively not 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  In response to the obvious-that 
there is no clear distinction between these two sets of rights-the Court 
explained that its distinctions were not simply “a hasty catalogue of the cases 
on the one side and the other [of the line of division],”134  but rather were the 
product of “a rationalizing principle which gives to discrete instances a proper 
order and coherence.”135 
Examination of the rationale in Palko makes it very difficult to find the 
“rationalizing principle [that gives] a proper order and coherence.”136  The 
most obvious flaw in the Court’s rationalizing principle is that, in circular 
fashion, it simply repeats the question that it was supposed to answer.  In 
purporting to answer the question of how we identify implied fundamental 
rights under the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause, the Court’s answer is 
to identify those rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” It does not 
appear that the Court has advanced the discussion at all by going from the 
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word “implied” to “implicit.”  All it has added beyond a rephrasing of the 
question is the term “ordered.”  The Court did not explain how the modifier 
“ordered” limited the scope of what would otherwise be included in 
“unmodified” liberty or whether it was attempting to exclude a category of 
rights that could only be part of a “disordered” liberty. 
Beyond the circularity and emptiness of the Palko test, the substantive 
problem with Palko was the Court’s unsupported assumption that it was 
capable of distinguishing, in a logically consistent way, those rights that are 
implicit in ordered liberty from those rights that are not.  While the Court in 
Palko in 1937 was quite certain that the right to be free of double jeopardy was 
on the wrong side of the “implicit” line, thirty-two years later, the Supreme 
Court reached just the opposite result in Benton v. Maryland.137  In that case, 
the Court decided that the Fifth Amendment right to be free of double jeopardy 
was in fact part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and, 
so finding, expressly overruled Palko.138  The Benton Court not only reversed 
the specific result in Palko, with regard to double jeopardy, but also asserted 
that “Palko represented an approach to basic constitutional rights which this 
Court’s recent decisions have rejected.”139  Further, the Court noted, “Our 
recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic constitutional 
rights can be denied by states as long as the totality of the circumstances does 
not disclose a denial of ‘fundamental fairness.’”140  Finally, the Court made 
clear that the right to be free from double jeopardy is “clearly fundamental to 
the American scheme of justice.”141 
Benton is thus a thorough rejection both of the specific holding in Palko 
(that double jeopardy is not part of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause) 
and of its general “approach to basic constitutional rights.”  The very fact that 
Palko was subsequently overruled, and the resulting anomaly that double 
jeopardy was considered not to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty in 
1937 but had become so by 1968, suggest that Palko’s assumption that one can 
confidently make such distinctions is unwarranted.  Yet Palko lives on. 
In 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick,142 the Court considered whether a 
Georgia sodomy statute infringed the fundamental right of privacy that is part 
of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause.143  The Court wanted to “assure 
itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the 
Constitution’s text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices’ 
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own choice of values.”144  To demonstrate that its own decision in Bowers was 
not such an imposition of a personal value judgment but rather the result of a 
rule of law, the Court cited, as one of its two methods,145 Palko and its 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” test.  Conveniently, the Court 
ignored the fact that Palko had been overruled and that this overruling 
demonstrated the emptiness of its test.  The Bowers Court then, alluding to 
“ancient roots” of proscriptions against sodomy, concluded that “to claim that 
a right to engage in such conduct is . . . ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”146  On reading this explanation of “liberty,” one 
cannot help but be reminded of Justice Stewart’s constitutional test for 
identifying pornography–“I know it when I see it.”147 
Since Bowers, the “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” test occurs 
occasionally in Supreme Court opinions,148 often paired with the “history and 
traditions” test discussed below,149  but it has no more substance now than it 
had in Palko or Bowers. 
2. “Implicitly Guaranteed by the Constitution” and the Equal Protection 
Clause 
The Court has also used an “implicit” test under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,150 a case 
decided on equal protection grounds, the Court rejected “societal significance” 
as the test for a fundamental right and then announced a new test–whether a 
right is “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”151  The same 
criticisms of circularity and emptiness directed at the Palko test are equally 
applicable here.  Since the question is one of implied fundamental rights, then, 
by definition, the right at issue will not be found explicitly in the Constitution.  
As with the Palko test, to say that a right is implied because it is “implicit” 
does not work. 
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez did suggest one test that might have saved the 
“implicitly guaranteed” test–that the implied right be tethered to specific 
provisions of the Constitution.152  Specifically, the test of whether or not a 
right was “implicitly guaranteed” could be measured by how closely connected 
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the alleged right was to an existing, explicit constitutional right.153  The Court 
had already engaged in this kind of reasoning under the First Amendment 
when it had found that there is an implied right of association, a right that is 
not explicitly created by the Constitution but which the Court has found to be 
so closely connected to freedom of speech that it is necessarily implied.154  
According to the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, an implied right to education was 
similarly connected to the right of free speech and the right to vote since one 
could not effectively exercise those rights without an education.155  The Court 
rejected that argument on the ground that “we have never presumed to possess 
either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective 
speech or the most informed electoral choice.”156  Thus education is not 
fundamental.157  Since Rodriguez, the Court occasionally makes reference to 
the “implicitly guaranteed” test,158 but it has had no significant effect on Court 
decisions. 
C. Because They Are Deeply Rooted in the Nation’s History and Tradition 
The Court has sometimes insisted that the test of whether or not a right is 
fundamental is to be determined by whether or not it is rooted in our Nation’s 
history and traditions. For Justice Scalia, this is the only proper test of a 
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause.  This section examines the 
Court’s use of this test. 
1. The Supreme Court Precedents 
In 1934, in Snyder v. Massachusetts,159 the Court considered a defendant’s 
appeal of a murder conviction.160  During the trial, the court had allowed the 
jury to visit the scene of the crime but had not allowed the defendant to 
accompany the jury.161  The defendant argued that this denial of his request 
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amounted to an unconstitutional denial of due process.162  The Supreme Court 
rejected that claim and affirmed the conviction and, in the course of doing so, 
stated what has become one of the standard tests for identifying implied 
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause.163  The Court said that the 
determination of proper court procedures was ordinarily a matter for state 
government “unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”164  
The Snyder case could easily have fit within the framework of what we now 
call procedural due process, since it was a challenge to the procedures used at 
trial, but the Court in Snyder did not bother with such fine distinctions and thus 
established an appeal to “traditions” as a test of a fundamental right.165 
This 1934 “traditions” test was revitalized beginning in the 1970s with 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.166  In that case, the Court considered a city 
ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single 
family and then defined the term “single-family” very narrowly.167  The effect 
of this ordinance was that a grandmother was not able to live in her home with 
her son and two grandsons, since the grandsons were cousins rather than 
brothers.168  In a plurality opinion, Justice Powell stated that, under the Due 
Process Clause, there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter.”169  The key question, though was how to ascertain what was within this 
“private realm” and thus beyond the reach of state regulation?The Court noted 
the need to be cautious, for “[s]ubstantive due process has at times been a 
treacherous field for this Court,”170 and “the history of the Lochner era”171  
demonstrated the danger of Justices looking to the Due Process Clause and 
finding their own predilections.  There was, however, a method that the Court 
said would limit the ability of individual Justices to read their own views into 
the Constitution–that is, the Constitution protects only those values “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”172 
The Court then went on to apply the “history and tradition” test.  
According to the Court, 
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the 
members of the nuclear family.  The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and 
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especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children 
has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional 
recognition. . . . Even if conditions of modern society have brought about a 
decline in extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated 
wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our 
history, that supports a larger conception of the family.173 
Once the Court had determined that the living arrangement at issue in Moore 
was part of a protected liberty interest, it did not even ask whether there was 
sufficient state justification, compelling or otherwise, to save it.  Instead, the 
Court simply concluded that “the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from 
standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain 
narrowly defined family patterns.”174  As far as explaining how it knew what 
were the relevant traditions that it ought to consider, the Court was silent.  It 
simply asserted, without supporting citation, its own view of the tradition of 
the extended family.175 
Probably the most significant case to adopt the “history and tradition” test 
was Bowers v. Hardwick,176  a 1986 case in which the Court upheld a Georgia 
sodomy statute against a due process attack.177  After citing both the “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty” test discussed above,178 and the “history and 
tradition” test from Moore v. East Cleveland,179 the Court quickly concluded 
that neither formulation of the due process standard would extend to reach the 
claim asserted, which the Court described as “the claimed constitutional right 
of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.”180  In explaining why this claim 
was not considered fundamental within our history and traditions, the Court 
cited a long list of statutes, from the time of the Bill of Rights, from the time of 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and from recent history, that 
criminalized sodomy and which, according to the Court, demonstrated that 
there was no history or tradition of protecting such conduct.181  Indeed, the 
Court characterized that claim as “facetious.”182 
After Bowers, the “history and tradition” test was a favorite of 
conservative members of the Court.  It had the remarkable quality of always 
leading to the conclusion that any asserted right was not fundamental.  It was a 
particular favorite of Justice Scalia. Three years after Bowers, in 1989, the 
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Court decided the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,183 in which a man who had 
demonstrated a 98.07% probability of being the father of a child sought to 
establish a legally protected relationship with the child.184  The relevant 
California statute provided that a child born to a married woman living with 
her husband is presumed to be a child of the marriage and that this 
presumption could be rebutted only by the husband or the wife.185  The 
putative father claimed that this presumption, which had the effect of cutting 
him off from his child, violated his constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
his relationship with his child.186  Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the 
Court, although only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined his entire opinion.187  The 
Scalia opinion rejected the claim of the putative father and relied heavily on 
the “history and traditions” test, citing both Snyder v. Massachusetts and 
Moore v. East Cleveland.188  As Scalia explained, the purpose of limiting due 
process protection to traditionally protected interests was “to prevent future 
generations from lightly casting aside important traditional values.”189 
Justice Scalia then applied the “traditions” test to the specific case of 
parental rights before him.190  The putative father had cited a number of 
Supreme Court cases in which the Court had protected the right of an unwed 
father in relation to his child.191  The father argued that these cases established 
the precedent that “a liberty interest is created by biological fatherhood plus an 
established parental relationship.”192  Justice Scalia rejected that reading of the 
cases, insisting instead that the cited cases rested on “the historic respect–
indeed sanctity would not be too strong a term–traditionally accorded to the 
relationships that develop within the unitary family.”193  Upon examination of 
the “traditions” involved, Justice Scalia found that there was no such tradition 
protecting “the power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child 
born into a woman’s existing marriage with another man.”194 
In response to Justice Brennan’s dissenting view that there was in fact a 
long history and tradition of protecting the parent/child relationship,195 Justice 
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Scalia argued that, in determining the appropriate level of generality to be used 
in identifying the relevant tradition, the Court should “refer to the most specific 
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the 
asserted right can be identified.”196  Thus while there might be a general 
tradition of protecting parent/child relationships, there was no specific tradition 
of protecting the rights of an unwed father against the interests of a married 
couple.197  For Justice Scalia, the statutory presumption in the case did not 
infringe on any liberty interest and thus, its propriety was “a question of 
legislative policy and not constitutional law.”198  Although Justice Scalia was 
able to persuade only one of his colleagues to join his entire Michael M. 
opinion,199 he bided his time for the chance to put that view into a majority 
opinion. 
Four years later, in Reno v. Flores,200  he got that opportunity.  In Reno, the 
Court considered a regulation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
under which alien juveniles who had been arrested and were being held for 
deportation hearings could be released only to a parent or other relative but 
would not automatically be released to another adult where no parent or 
relative was available.201  The effect of this rule was that juvenile aliens 
without parents or adult relatives were held in custody pending their 
deportation hearings.202  The plaintiffs in the case argued that this practice 
deprived them of liberty under the Due Process Clause.203  Justice Scalia wrote 
the opinion for the Court and rejected that claim.204 
Consistent with his opinion in Michael M., Justice Scalia identified the 
right claimed at a very specific level–”the alleged right of a child who has no 
available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the 
government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able 
private custodian rather than of a government-operated or government-selected 
child-care institution.”205  Given this very specific description of the right 
involved, Justice Scalia’s rejection of the claim was not at all surprising.  As he 
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explained, “The mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that 
‘substantive due process’ sustains it; the alleged right certainly cannot be 
considered ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.’”206  On the other hand, Justice Stevens, dissenting, 
found the claim made by the juvenile aliens not to be a novelty at all.207  In 
Stevens’ description, the right claimed was not the very specific right of 
juvenile aliens not to be detained in a very specific setting, but rather the more 
general “right not to be detained in the first place.”208  The tradition that 
Stevens would cite was that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or 
without trial is the carefully limited exception.”209  Thus, for Stevens, the claim 
of the juvenile aliens would have been part of a protected liberty interest. 
For the moment, however, Justice Scalia’s view appeared to be ascendant 
and Justice Stevens’ view only a dissenting opinion.  Scalia’s view again 
achieved majority status four years later, in 1997, in Washington v. 
Glucksberg,210 a case in which the Court considered the claim that a statute 
banning assisted suicide violated the Due Process Clause.211  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court.212  He said, “We begin, as we do in 
all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and 
practices.”213  As explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the “history and 
traditions” method, because it is “carefully refined by concrete examples 
involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal 
tradition,”214 would work to “rein in the subjective elements that are 
necessarily present in due process judicial review.”215  Justice Rehnquist then 
went on to review the history and traditions involving suicide and found that, 
“for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished 
or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”216  Rehnquist 
described this as “a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long 
rejected the asserted right [the right to commit suicide which includes a right to 
assistance in doing so], and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for 
terminally ill, mentally competent adults.”217  Thus, the Court found that 
assistance in committing suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest 
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protected by the Due Process Clause.218  Had the Court been willing to define 
the tradition more broadly, as a liberty interest in “bodily integrity,”219  an 
interest that would mean that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body,”220 then 
the claim of a right to assisted suicide would have had a stronger foundation. 
The Court’s most recent review of the “history and traditions” method was 
in 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas,221 and it was not a good case for the proponents 
of that model.  In Lawrence, the Court reviewed a Texas statute that 
criminalized sodomy between persons of the same sex.222  As in Bowers, the 
claim was that the statute violated the liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause.223  In the course of its opinion, the Court had to address its 
earlier opinion in Bowers, which had adopted the “history and traditions” test 
and which had described the tradition at a very specific level.224  In Lawrence, 
however, the Court explained: “History and tradition are the starting point but 
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”225 For 
the majority in Lawrence, the starting point of history and tradition led to an 
ending point that was reached only after consideration of the more relevant, 
and more recent “laws and traditions in the past half century.”226  These more 
recent traditions included a line of Supreme Court cases that, taken as a whole, 
led to a general principle that “there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter,” and this realm includes the private sexual conduct 
of two consenting adults.227 
This majority opinion in Lawrence is a clear rejection of the “history and 
traditions” model that had been espoused by Justice Scalia.  Justice Scalia, in 
turn, sharply critiqued the majority for having departed from the Court’s 
precedents.228  According to Scalia, the only fundamental rights that qualify for 
heightened scrutiny are those “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and 
tradition.”229  As support for this assertion, he cited, inter alia, his own 
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opinions in Reno and Michael M. 230  But the “history and tradition” model has 
never been the only method the Court has used to identify implied fundamental 
rights under the Due Process Clause.  The assertion that it has been ignores the 
other methods identified in this section, as well as the implied fundamental 
rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause. 
2. Does the History and Traditions Model Work? 
Those who favor the “history and traditions” method of identifying 
fundamental rights view the method as an objective means of restraining 
judges from reading their subjective preferences into the Constitution.231  Does 
it really work in that way?  In almost any controversial case, there are very 
likely to be disagreements on the question of exactly what our traditions are. 
Firstly, “our traditions” change over time.  Justice Harlan, dissenting in 
Poe v. Ullman232 from the Court’s refusal to hear the case on the merits, 
alluded to this difficulty.233  Harlan spoke of the necessity of balancing the 
liberty of the individual with the demands of organized society and of the need 
to limit judges who might otherwise feel “free to roam where unguided 
speculation might take them.”234  The appropriate balance would be achieved, 
according to Harlan, by reference to “what history teaches are the traditions 
from which [this country] developed as well as the traditions from which it 
broke.”235  Harlan’s reference to the two kinds of traditions–those that we 
continue to practice and those that we have abandoned–demonstrate one of the 
more serious problems with the use of tradition to explain constitutional 
liberty.236  America has a number of older, less savory traditions-slavery and 
officially sanctioned racial segregation come most readily to mind-that have 
been abandoned.  At one point in time, however, each of these was part of our 
county’s “history and tradition” and thus could at that time appropriately have 
been used to inform the Court on the meaning of “liberty.”  Of course, these 
are not current traditions, but how is a court to know when a tradition is no 
longer relevant to the determination of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause? 
Justice Brennan did not believe that there was an effective response to the 
question of when traditions gain or lose their relevance.  To him, “tradition” 
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was a concept “as malleable and as elusive as ‘liberty’ itself,” and the claim 
that it served to limit judicial discretion was merely a seductive pretense.237  In 
fact, as Justice Brennan pointed out, a number of interests that previous 
Supreme Court cases have identified as fundamental, such as the legal right of 
married and unmarried couples to use contraceptives or the right to raise one’s 
illegitimate child, were not traditionally protected when those cases were first 
filed, but became so in the aftermath of the Supreme Court opinion.238  How, 
asked Brennan, is the Court “to identify the point at which a tradition becomes 
firm enough to be relevant to our definition of liberty and the moment at which 
it becomes too obsolete to be relevant any longer.”239 
Secondly, in addition to the problem of traditions changing over time, 
courts face the historical task of establishing exactly what our traditions were 
at any particular time.  The Court’s opinions in Bowers and Lawrence are an 
example of how two different courts can give startlingly different accounts of 
the history that underlies a claimed tradition.  In Bowers, the Court cited the 
criminal law pertaining to sodomy during the course of American history to 
support its conclusion that there was absolutely no tradition in America that 
would protect what the Court called “a claimed constitutional right of 
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.”240  On the other hand, seventeen 
years later, in Lawrence, the Court, addressing this same question, insisted that 
“there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual 
conduct as a distinct matter.”241  As the Lawrence majority viewed earlier 
sodomy laws, they were “not directed at homosexuals as such but instead 
sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally.”242  Justice 
Scalia, of course, disagreed with this interpretation of history.  He insisted that 
the historical record unimpeachably showed “a longstanding history of laws 
prohibiting sodomy in general–regardless of whether it was performed by 
same-sex or opposite-sex couples,”243 and this history showed, in “utterly 
unassailable” fashion, that “homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”244 
Professional historians might be able to take sides on the matter of whose 
version of history is more accurate, but it does not seem prudent to have a 
constitutional standard under which the question of what rights are 
fundamental under our Constitution is answered, not by reference to the 
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Constitution, but by selecting from among competing versions of historical 
events.  If the Court followed this theory, then, as new historical information 
became available or existing historical theories were revised, fundamental 
rights under the Constitution might change as well. 
Thirdly, the “history and tradition” model is too easily manipulated by the 
level of generality at which the Court chooses to describe a particular tradition.  
This dispute about the appropriate level of generality has turned out to be 
critical.  If, like Justice Scalia, one chooses to define the tradition at its most 
specific level, the effect in most circumstances is to reject the claim of an 
implied fundamental right.  If, on the other hand, one defines the tradition in 
broader terms, the result is far more likely to support the finding of a 
fundamental right.  In each of the recent cases in which Justice Scalia has 
staked out a position in opposition to the finding of an implied fundamental 
right, his very specific description of that right has led to the conclusion that it 
is not fundamental. 
Thus, in Bowers, the majority described the tradition as involving “a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”245  The dissenters in 
Bowers insisted that the right at issue was no more about homosexual sodomy 
than “Stanley v. Georgia . . . was about a fundamental right to watch obscene 
movies, or Katz v. United States . . . was about a fundamental right to place 
interstate bets from a telephone booth.”246  The dissenters would have 
described the right at issue as “‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be let alone.’”247  
Similarly, in Michael H., Justice Scalia described the interest involved as “the 
power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a 
woman’s existing marriage with another man,” and found no such right 
protected by our history and traditions.248  On the other hand, the dissenters in 
Michael H. described the interest broadly as the protection of the parent/child 
relationship, and they were able to point to a number of cases that protected 
that right, thus demonstrating that it was part of our history and tradition.249 
Two additional examples illustrate the point further.  In Reno v. Flores, 
Scalia described the issue very narrowly–”the alleged right of a child who has 
no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the 
government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able 
private custodian rather than of a government-operated or government-selected 
child-care institution,” and found that such a claimed right was not protected 
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by our history and traditions.250  The dissenters in Reno described the right as 
the right not to be detained without trial and found that that right was protected 
by our history and traditions.251  Finally, in Glucksberg, the majority defined 
the interest at stake narrowly, as “a right to commit suicide which itself 
includes a right to assistance in doing so,” and found it not to be part of our 
history and traditions,252 while the dissenters would have described it more 
broadly as the right of “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind . . . 
to determine what shall be done with his own body,” and would have found it 
part of our history and traditions and protected by the Due Process Clause.253 
In sum, it seems that there is no agreement as to how the Court should use 
traditions that have changed over time, no agreement on what in fact certain 
traditions were at a particular time, and no agreement on the level of generality 
at which a given tradition is to be described.  Without agreement on these 
issues, the “history and traditions” test is far too malleable to be a helpful 
constitutional guide. 
D. Because They Need Protection from Government Action that Shocks the 
Conscience 
In 1952, in Rochin v. California,254 the Court considered a case in which 
the police had arranged to have a suspect’s stomach pumped in order to 
produce evidence of illegal drugs.255  The question was whether this kind of 
conduct violated the Due Process Clause.256  The Court initially cited both 
Snyder’s “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people” test as well as 
Palko’s “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” test.257  Apparently, these 
two tests were not precise enough to decide the case.  Justice Frankfurter, 
writing for the majority, found that the proceedings in the case where the 
police forcibly extracted the contents of a suspect’s stomach constituted a kind 
of conduct that “shocks the conscience” and therefore violated the Due Process 
Clause.258 
It was not clear that Rochin was a substantive due process case. Since the 
problem identified was part of the process of arresting and investigating the 
case, it might have been considered a procedural due process case, if not a case 
on compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.  Nevertheless, 
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the Supreme Court in at least one later case has read Rochin as establishing an 
implied fundamental right to some level of “bodily integrity,”259 thus 
suggesting that it establishes a substantive rather than a procedural standard.  
Rochin is a hard case to explain.  Its “shocks the conscience” standard hardly 
provides any sort of objective standard that would make police conduct subject 
to review by courts in a consistent way.  To the extent that Rochin was a case 
of substantive due process, it certainly is strange to describe a protected 
“liberty” interest, not by reference to the interest protected, but rather by 
reference to a certain kind of outrageous conduct on the part of the 
government.  In any case, Rochin for a long time appeared to be a relatively 
minor case of merely historical interest, until 1998, when the Court brought it 
back to life in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.260 
In Lewis, a high-speed police chase resulted in the death of one of those 
being chased.261  In the lawsuit that followed, the Supreme Court described the 
issue as “whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or 
reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase.”262  The Court’s 
ultimate answer was no, but in the course of its opinion, it explained that the 
appropriate standard to use in determining whether “abusive executive 
action”263 violates the Due Process Clause is the “shocks the conscience” test 
from Rochin, which the Court described, surprisingly, as having been 
“repeatedly adhered to” in the years since Rochin.264  The Court then tried to 
give some objective content to what certainly seems to be an extremely vague 
and subjective standard.265  According to the Court, in determining whether 
police conduct in a high-speed chase “shocks the conscience” and is therefore 
a violation of substantive due process, neither negligence on the part of the 
police was sufficient, nor deliberate indifference, but only an “intent to harm 
suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight.”266 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, finding no violation of 
substantive due process, but, of course, disagreed with the Court’s use of the 
“shocks the conscience” test.267  As noted earlier, in Scalia’s view, the only 
liberty interests protected under the Due Process Clause were those “deeply 
rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.”268  In what may well be his most 
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entertaining opinion, Justice Scalia cited Cole Porter in comparing the 
majority’s over-the-top opinion with Porter’s examples of top-shelf icons, such 
as “the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane,”269 and 
insisted that the majority had resuscitated the “ne plus ultra . . . of subjectivity, 
th’ ol’ ‘shocks-the-conscience’ test.”270 
After Lewis, the “ol’ shocks-the-conscience” test can no longer be regarded 
as a mere historical relic.  Although it is also now clear that the Rochin test is a 
substantive due process test, it is not clear how this analysis fits with the 
Court’s general jurisprudence of implied fundamental rights.  Although Justice 
Scalia treated the issue as one of identifying an implied fundamental right as in 
Glucksberg,271 the Lewis majority spoke of due process as “protection of the 
individual against arbitrary action of the government,”272 a test that makes no 
reference to fundamental rights.  As for the future effect of Lewis, it is quite 
possible that the Court will limit its “shocks-the-conscience” test to cases of 
alleged police misconduct, the factual settings of both Rochin and Lewis. 
E. Structural Arguments: Because They Are Necessarily Implied from the 
Structure of the Federal Government or from the Structure of the 
Constitution 
1. Implied from the Structure of the Federal Government 
In 1969, the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson273 considered an equal 
protection challenge to a durational residence requirement under which new 
residents of Connecticut could not receive welfare benefits until they had lived 
in the state for at least one year.274  The Court applied a heightened standard of 
review–“any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a 
constitutional] right [must be] shown to be necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest.”275  The constitutional right at issue here was the “right 
to travel interstate.”  Of course, no right to travel is explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution.  Since this was an equal protection case, the Court could not 
attach the claimed right to the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause, but 
that was not a problem.  The Court indicated that it had “no occasion to ascribe 
the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional 
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provision.”276  Instead, the Court in effect found a freestanding implied right to 
travel.277  Its source was not any particular provision in the Constitution itself.  
Rather, the idea of the right to travel is “fundamental to the concept of our 
Federal Union.”278 
There is logic to this assertion.  The pre-Constitutional Articles of 
Confederation did indeed contain an express right to travel between the 
states.279  The confederacy created by the Articles was much weaker than the 
subsequent federal union, since the states that established that confederacy 
retained full sovereignty, and thus without explicit protection, it was not 
certain that persons were free to travel between these sovereign states.  On the 
other hand, when thirteen sovereign states came together in 1787 to form the 
United States of America, in that new, more powerful federal union, the states 
gave up some of their sovereign status. This new Union would not have been 
possible, and would have made no sense, unless citizens of that Union were 
free to travel from one end of it to another.  Just as the state constitution of 
Connecticut needs no explicit provision to create a right to travel between New 
Haven and Hartford, so the federal Constitution did not need an explicit 
provision to create a right to travel between New Haven and New York City.  
In both cases, the concept of sovereignty necessarily includes a fundamental 
right to travel within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. Thus, the structure of the 
federal union implies a fundamental right to interstate travel. 
Notwithstanding the necessity in a federal union of a right to travel, the 
Court’s opinion in Shapiro is surprisingly cavalier in its assertion that it need 
not identify a constitutional source for that right.  The Court made no reference 
to “history and traditions,” and no appeal to what is “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty” (although it must be said that, since Shapiro was not a due 
process case, there was no need to cite those precedents).  Shapiro has the feel 
of a case decided in a separate universe, a universe where there is no Lochner, 
no line of selective incorporation cases, and no history of implied fundamental 
rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause.  Shapiro reaches what is surely 
the proper result with its reliance on the structure of government to find an 
implied fundamental right, but, in terms of constitutional method, it is a case 
unto itself. 
Recently, the Court has narrowed this kind of structural argument as it 
applies to the implied fundamental right to travel.  In 1999, in Saenz v. Roe,280 
the Court reviewed a California statute that, like the one in Shapiro, limited 
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welfare benefits to new state residents during their first year of residence.281  
Unlike the statute in Shapiro, however, the California statute did not deny 
benefits completely during that period but rather limited the amount of the 
benefit to a level no higher than the claimant could have received in his or her 
previous state of residence.282  The California statute was designed to address 
the argument in Shapiro that the failure to offer any benefit at all during that 
one-year period was a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel.283  The 
Court in Saenz saw no constitutional difference between the two statutes and 
invalidated California’s.284  In its opinion, however, the Court gave a narrower, 
more nuanced explanation of the constitutional source of the right to travel.285 
According to the Court, the right to interstate travel is made up of three 
different components, and each of these components has a different source.286  
The first component-the right of a citizen of one state to cross state borders 
into another state-is, as in Shapiro, “a necessary concomitant of the stronger 
Union the Constitution created.”287  The second and third components of the 
right to travel had different origins.  The second component–the right, by 
virtue of state citizenship, to travel temporarily to another state and “be treated 
as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien”–is protected by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.288  The third component-the 
right, by virtue of being a citizen of the United States, to elect to become a 
resident of another state and be treated like other citizens of that State-is 
protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.289  Thus, after Saenz v. Roe, there are three components of the 
right to travel between states, and only one needs to be implied.  The second 
and third are now identified as explicit constitutional rights that need not be 
implied from the concept of the federal Union. 
The method of implying a fundamental right to travel from the structure of 
the federal Union is a sound one, but it does not appear to be a method that can 
be generalized beyond the one specific right to travel.  Thus, the Court has not 
made use of this method of implying fundamental rights for any other right, 
nor does it seem possible to use it as a foundation for a general theory of 
identifying implied fundamental rights. 
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2. Implied from the Structure of the Constitution 
In 1965, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut290 determined that a 
Connecticut statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by married 
couples was unconstitutional.291  Griswold is widely viewed as a significant 
linchpin in the development of substantive due process cases that led to Roe v. 
Wade and Lawrence v. Texas.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, Griswold was 
not a due process decision.  In fact, Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court 
took great pains to note that the Court was not following Lochner as precedent 
nor was it basing its decision on the “liberty” interest in the Due Process 
Clause.292  Instead Justice Douglas, in a much criticized opinion, spoke of the 
“penumbras formed by emanations”293 from the guarantees of specific kinds of 
privacy in the Bill of Rights and used these “penumbras formed by 
emanations” as a basis for finding a more generalized, more encompassing 
right of privacy.294  This right of privacy included the freedom of a married 
couple to use contraceptives within the sanctity of their bedroom without the 
interference of the state.295 
Justice Douglas’s decision to use the terms “penumbras” and “emanations” 
was not a happy one.  That language opened him up to the criticism that his use 
of sloppy, vague language led to a sloppy, vague constitutional result that was 
not tethered to any particular provision in the Constitution.296  Griswold 
appears to have created a freestanding, free-floating constitutional right.  So 
the critique goes. It is difficult to argue in favor of Justice Douglas’s choice of 
the terms “penumbra” and “emanations,” but his opinion does contain a 
defensible constitutional theory of implied fundamental rights. 
Justice Douglas examined five provisions of the Bill of Rights that create 
specific enforceable zones of privacy into which the government may not 
enter.297  He identified the right of association protected by the First 
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Amendment, the prohibition of quartering soldiers from the Third Amendment, 
the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” in the Fourth Amendment, 
the protection against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, and the 
Ninth Amendment’s specific recognition that the enumeration of certain rights 
in the Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people.”298  As Justice Douglas viewed these Amendments, while each 
created a specific area of privacy into which government may not enter, they 
also, taken together, created a structure under which government is limited in 
the extent to which it can invade the private areas of a person’s life.299  The 
view that the particular areas of privacy protected by the specific amendments 
are part of a larger, more general right to privacy is strengthened by the Ninth 
Amendment’s specific language to this effect.  Douglas is effectively asking, 
“Can you imagine a Constitution under which the government cannot, without 
a warrant, come into your home to search for drugs but has the even more 
intrusive power to dictate to a married couple what they do in the bedroom of 
that home?”  Looking to future controversies, Douglas might have asked, “Can 
you imagine a Constitution under which the government does not have the 
power to specify with whom you may associate, but is able to dictate who your 
sexual partners may be and what sexual activity, with a consenting adult 
partner, you are allowed to engage in?” 
Although the Griswold case is an extremely important case on the road to 
Roe and Lawrence, Justice Douglas’s reasoning in Griswold has been given 
little precedential weight.  But the idea that one can identify implied 
fundamental rights from the structure of the Constitution is a valid one, 
including the idea that one can imply a general right from a series of specific 
rights.  However, like Shapiro’s argument from the structure of government, 
Griswold’s argument from the structure of the Constitution has been 
subsequently ignored by the Court. 
F. Because They Provide Necessary Access to Governmental Processes 
The Court has found that there is an implied fundamental right to vote and 
an implied fundamental right to some level of access to court processes.  The 
justification for these fundamental rights is that legislation and adjudication in 
the courts are essential elements of a democracy and that a limitation on access 
to these two institutions is a threat to the institution of government itself. 
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1. Access to the Legislature 
As far back as 1938, in United States v. Carolene Products,300 the Court 
stated in its famous footnote 4 that the deference courts ordinarily gave to 
legislative enactments might not be appropriate in reviewing legislation that 
“restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring 
about repeal of undesirable legislation.”301  The dictum of this footnote was 
translated into holding in 1964 in Reynolds v. Sims,302 a case in which the 
Supreme Court invalidated the method of electing the two houses of the 
Alabama legislature from geographic districts that had wildly uneven 
populations and thus disproportionate weight attached to each vote.303  In 
explaining why it would give heightened scrutiny to this method of electing the 
legislature, the Court first cited Skinner, since like the law at issue in that case, 
the restriction on voting touched on “a sensitive and important area of human 
rights” and it “involve[d] one of the basic civil rights of man.”304  The Court 
then went on from this vague and general reference to the right’s being 
“important” and “basic” to explain why the right to vote was fundamental.305  
Voting is a fundamental right because “the right to exercise the franchise in a 
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights.”306  Because the right to vote is fundamental, “any alleged infringement 
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously 
scrutinized.”307  The Court then used this heightened scrutiny not only to 
invalidate the disproportionate voting system in Reynolds, but also, in later 
cases, to invalidate other state restrictions on the right to vote, including a poll 
tax,308 a requirement of owning or possessing land as a voter qualification,309 a 
one-year residency requirement,310 and a restrictive rule that made it hard for 
third parties to get access to the ballot.311 
There is no question that the protection of access to voting is essential for 
democracy to work so this “protecting access to the legislature” model is an 
effective explanation of this particular fundamental right.  It is, on the other 
hand, not the kind of model that can be generalized into a theory about implied 
fundamental rights, other than in the one other closely connected context, 
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access to the court system.312  The Court, however, has not always made it 
clear how this particular model is to be applied in voting rights cases.  For 
example, in Bush v. Gore,313 the Court found a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause in the manner in which Florida was counting ballots in the 
2000 presidential election, yet did not make clear what standard of review it 
was using.314  Further, the Court purported to limit its ruling to the specific 
facts before it.315  So although the right to vote is fundamental, the exact 
mechanism for courts to use in protecting this right is not clear. 
2. Access to the Courts 
Since 1956, the Court has applied some kind of heightened scrutiny in 
reviewing challenges to the denial of access to the courts in criminal cases.  In 
Griffin v. Illinois,316 the Court, on both equal protection and due process 
grounds, invalidated a state scheme in Illinois under which convicted 
defendants who could not afford a transcript of the trial proceedings lost the 
right to appeal.317  As the Court explained, “a State is not required by the 
Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review 
at all,”318 but once the state has established such a system, the state could not 
limit its availability in a way that discriminated on account of poverty.319  The 
Griffin Court did not use any of the terminology that we have since come to 
associate with this area of the law, such as “implied fundamental right,” “strict 
scrutiny,” or “compelling interest,” nor did it announce any formal method for 
determining when a right is fundamental.  The Court did, in commonsense 
terms, explain why access to the appellate process was important–since it was 
important for the “correct adjudication of guilt or innocence.”320  As the Court 
pointed out, “a substantial proportion of criminal convictions are reversed by 
state appellate courts.”321  Thus, the opportunity to prove to an appellate court 
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that a conviction in the trial court was wrong has some kind of fundamental 
status.322 
In 1971, in Boddie v. Connecticut,323 the Court broadened to some extent 
the fundamental right of access to courts by including certain civil cases.324  
The plaintiffs in Boddie were welfare recipients challenging the required fees 
they had to pay in order to file divorce actions.325  The Court decided the case 
on due process grounds, and, to some extent, the Court’s heightened scrutiny 
depended on the resulting infringement of the fundamental right to marriage, 
which included a right to terminate that marriage.326  The case was also about 
access to the courts as a fundamental matter, at least where the state has, 
through its court system, monopolized the means for adjusting legal 
relationships.327  As the Court explained, “due process reflects a fundamental 
value in our American constitutional system,”328 and “[i]t is to courts, or other 
quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of 
a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.”329  Thus, where the state 
has through its court system monopolized the method of dispute settlement, as 
is the case for divorce, then some right of access to the court system is 
fundamental.330  On the other hand, the Court has made clear that, as a general 
rule, fee requirements in civil cases ordinarily are examined only for 
rationality.331  It appears that it is only where access to the courts in a civil 
matter involves some other fundamental interest, like marriage or the 
parent/child relationship,332 or where the state has given the courts a monopoly 
on resolving a particular kind of dispute, that the Court will apply a heightened 
scrutiny.333 
The “access to the courts” justification for identifying fundamental rights 
does not seem to produce any wrong decisions, but it will never be an 
important building block for a general system of implied fundamental rights.  
There is first the problem that “access to the courts” arguments are more 
obviously about procedure than substance and are more easily viewed as 
questions of procedural due process. Second, the two specific substantive 
justifications that the Court has used to support the fundamental nature of 
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access to the court–the desire to get things right and the monopolization of 
certain dispute settlement procedures–are very difficult to generalize beyond 
these particular factual settings. 
G. Because Previous Supreme Court Precedents Identify Them 
The search for the source, or sources, of implied fundamental rights is 
usually seen to be a search for first principles, that is, basic principles outside 
the Constitution and outside previous Court decisions that can justify the 
identification of certain rights as fundamental.  Thus, for example, we have the 
“history and traditions” test and the “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 
test.  However, in recent years, in three of the Court’s most significant 
decisions,334 the Court has engaged in a more modest kind of reasoning.  It has 
not attempted to establish first principles from outside the Constitution but 
rather has accepted as given previous Supreme Court cases and attempted to 
use the specific holdings of those cases to establish a more generalized 
principle of privacy as a fundamental right. 
In Roe v. Wade,335 the Court began by conceding that “[t]he Constitution 
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.”336  Then, without citation to 
any general theory of implied fundamental rights, it went on to cite “a line of 
decisions . . . going back perhaps as far as [1891]”337 in which “the Court has 
recognized that a certain right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain 
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”338  The Court 
then cited thirteen cases falling into two sets.  The first seven identified 
possible sources of the right to privacy in the Constitution,339 and the next six 
identified certain aspects of privacy that were protected.340  At that point, 
without choosing any one of the previously cited methods for identifying the 
right, and without relying on any one of the previously cited aspects of the 
right, the Court drew the general conclusion that these previous cases, although 
specific in the kinds of privacy protected, were best understood as recognizing 
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a broad and generalized right to privacy that is part of Fourteenth Amendment 
“liberty.”341  This right of privacy included within it “a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”342  This is the kind of legal 
reasoning that historically was used by common law judges to establish general 
legal principles from previous specific cases that served as precedents.343 
Nineteen years after Roe, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,344 a plurality opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter reviewed the precedential value of Roe v. Wade.345  In doing so, the 
plurality gave great weight to the Court’s earlier precedents, without any 
appeal to underlying theories of where fundamental rights come from.346  
Rather, the plurality emphasized the doctrine of stare decisis as crucial to their 
conclusion that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and 
once again reaffirmed.”347  The plurality explained that “the reservations any 
of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the 
explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of 
stare decisis.”348  The Casey plurality thus used the earlier Supreme Court 
precedents, particularly Roe, and the formal doctrine of stare decisis to explain 
the nature of the fundamental right of privacy as it relates to abortion. 
Eleven years later, the Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas349 used a 
similar kind of case-specific reasoning to provide authority for an implied 
fundamental right.350  The Lawrence Court first made reference to the “liberty” 
interest that had been identified in the Pierce, Meyer, Griswold, Eisenstadt, 
and Roe line of cases.351  The Court viewed these cases as having established 
(1) that “the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends 
beyond the marital relationship;”352 (2) that liberty includes “the right of a 
woman to make certain fundamental decisions  affecting her destiny;”353 and 
(3) that this liberty includes a “substantive dimension of fundamental 
 
 341. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 342. Id. at 153. 
 343. The development of the contract doctrine of consideration is a good example of courts 
developing a general doctrine over time on the basis of a series of particular cases.  For a 
discussion of the historical development of the consideration doctrine, see E. ALLEN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 14-19 (2004). 
 344. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 849. 
 347. Id. at 846. 
 348. Id. at 852. 
 349. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 350. Id. at 564-65. 
 351. Id. at 564-65. 
 352. Id. at 565. 
 353. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] AN EXCESS OF METHODS 247 
significance in defining the rights of the person.”354  In light of these 
precedents, the Lawrence Court determined that Bowers v. Hardwick had been 
incorrectly decided and had to be overruled, since its penalties and purposes 
attempted to regulate “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in 
the most private of places, the home.”355 
The use of previous cases as precedents rather than an appeal to broad first 
principles can be viewed as a modest form of judicial reasoning that does not 
attempt to make new law but only to discern how existing law applies in a new 
factual setting.  Of course, critics of Roe and Lawrence would say that the 
Court went well beyond previous precedents rather than simply applying them, 
but that would be a criticism of the particular use of this method in these cases, 
rather than a general critique of this method as a form of constitutional 
reasoning.  There still is one unanswerable criticism of this method–how does 
the Court get its precedents in the first place?  That is, by the time of Roe, there 
was a history of implied fundamental rights cases from which the Court could 
select relevant precedents that would help decide the current case.  How had 
the Courts that decided those earlier cases, without the benefit of precedents, 
identified implied fundamental rights?  The method of reasoning from existing 
precedents can work in a mature system that has already decided enough 
relevant cases to serve as precedents, but such a method could never justify the 
original precedents. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court has no general theory of implied 
fundamental rights under the Constitution.  That should come as no surprise, 
given that the Court is a multi-member body that changes over time and can 
decide only the particular case before it.  What the Court does have is a series 
of methods that it uses in particular cases.  In the ordinary course, the Court 
tends to treat the due process and equal protection cases as independent of each 
other.  Thus, the “history and traditions” test, the “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty” test, and the “shocks the conscience” test are used only under 
the Due Process Clause.  On the other hand, the societal importance test, the 
structural test, and the access to governmental processes test are ordinarily 
used in equal protection cases.356  The “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by 
the Constitution” test was developed in an equal protection case, but it 
effectively overlaps the due process “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 
test. Nevertheless, having established separate tests for identifying 
fundamental rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the 
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Court tends to treat them as interchangeable when such treatment serves its 
purposes. 
As for the merits of the tests, none of them is entirely satisfactory.  The 
three Due Process tests-”implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” “history 
and traditions,” and “shocks the conscience”–all have the benefit of being 
broad theories of general applicability.  However, the first of these suffers from 
the defect of being so vague and circular that it does not at all advance the 
discussion about the source of implied fundamental rights.  The second suffers 
from the defect that there is no agreement on what our history and traditions 
are and which ones count and at what level of generality.  The third suffers 
from the defect of beings a standardless, subjective methodology.  The method 
of relying on previous Supreme Court precedents to identify fundamental 
rights in new settings is a workable method, but only if one accepts the 
question-begging use of earlier precedents that do not themselves adequately 
explain the source of the alleged right. 
The structural and access analyses that the Court has used under the Equal 
Protection Clause do not suffer from the defects of vagueness, subjectivity, or 
disputes over history, but none of them is capable of being generalized to form 
a broader theory.  Thus, the structure of a federal government argument is quite 
adequate to explain the implied fundamental right to cross state lines, but 
nothing beyond that.  The access to governmental processes method works to 
explain the fundamental rights to vote and to have some level of access to the 
courts but, once again, does not seem capable of being generalized into a 
theory.  On the other hand, the more general test of societal importance seems 
too vague and subjective to constitute a valid constitutional theory. 
So where does that leave us?  Not in a very satisfactory position.  Perhaps 
the very idea that courts, and therefore judges, are capable of creating an 
objective, defensible, constitutionally-based method and theory for identifying 
implied fundamental rights is implausible.  A search for an “implied” 
constitutional right is, by definition, a search for something that cannot be 
found in the Constitution, but surely the rights themselves exist. The very 
concept of government in America involves limits on government power and 
corresponding protections of individual liberty.  The Ninth Amendment makes 
clear that the drafters of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights were quite 
certain that not all of the individual rights that are protected from government 
intrusion find explicit protection in the Constitution.  What this means is that 
courts, and therefore judges, have no choice but to fill in the blanks.  This 
article is an account of the methods the Supreme Court has used in its 
necessary task of filling in the blanks. 
 
